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Objective In many low-income countries, public health systems do not meet the needs and demands of the population. We aimed 
to assess the extent to which output-based payment could boost staff productivity at health care facilities.
Methods We assessed the performance of 15 health care centres in Kabutare, Rwanda, comparing productivity in 2001, when fixed 
annual bonuses were paid to staff, with that in 2003, when an output-based payment incentive scheme was implemented.
Findings Changes to the structure of contracts were associated with improvements in health centre performance: specifically, 
output-based performance contracts induced sharp increases in the productivity of health staff.
Conclusion Institutional configurations of health care organizations deserve more attention. Those currently in place in the public 
sector may not the most suitable to meet current challenges in health care. More experiments are needed to confirm these early 
results from Rwanda and elsewhere, since risks associated with output-based incentive schemes should not be ignored.
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Introduction
Public health systems in low-income 
countries do not always live up to ex-
pectations. Poor performance in terms of 
coverage of needs, equity, quality of care, 
responsiveness to users and efficiency 
has been extensively documented.1–3 
Without major changes, especially in 
the delivery of primary health care, the 
health status in most rural populations 
will not achieve the significant im-
provements that are needed to meet the 
Millennium Development Goals.4 A lack 
of funds reaching the health sector has 
been the usual explanation for this poor 
performance.5 Without denying that 
funding bottlenecks need to be tackled, 
several authors have stressed the need 
to reconsider how public health systems 
are operated.6,7
While there are undoubtedly fac-
tors to be fixed at the system level (e.g. 
risk-pooling), one should not shy away 
from the fact that a fair part of the poor 
performance of these health care systems 
is due to faults within the health facilities 
themselves.8 Before poor performance 
can be addressed, the extent to which the 
problems can be remedied by staff at the 
health facilities should be ascertained. 
Obviously, some aspects related to the 
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quality of services are not within their 
short-term control: for example, their 
level of education and the equipment 
available set limits on what a health 
professional can accomplish. However, 
staff may have some control over many 
other aspects that affect service delivery, 
such as poor management of resources, 
absenteeism, disrespect for users of 
health services and a disinterest in qual-
ity improvement.
Before trying to tackle a problem, it 
is appropriate to view it in a broad con-
text. One must be fair towards the health 
staff. Many problems that are observed 
at the level of the public health facilities 
are also reported in other government-
run bodies such as schools and the civil 
administration.3 Some pro-market pro-
ponents may see these problems as an 
opportunity to discredit any role for the 
state in service provision. Opponents to 
this argument may instead place blame 
on poverty and limited capacity within 
the country; they will invite us to have 
patience and, in the meantime, to accept 
that some problems have their roots 
beyond the health sector.
In this paper, we discuss a third way 
for problem resolution, exploring the ex-
tent to which the performance of public 
health facilities could be enhanced by 
reform of some key institutions that es-
tablish them as organizations. We focus 
on only one dimension of performance, 
that of staff productivity and present 
results of the performance initiative, 
an output-based payment approach 
currently being trialed in the Kabutare 
district of Rwanda.
Methods
Institutional configurations in 
health care
Institutional arrangements, contracts 
and organizations have been very dy-
namic fields of research for economists 
in the past 40 years. Today, economists 
have a much better understanding of the 
influence of factors such as asymmetry 
of information, transaction costs and 
property rights on institutional shape 
and performance of organizations.9-12 
Rich in coordination problems, the 
health sector has been a particularly good 
setting for both theoretical exploration 
and policy applications.13,14 In high- 
and middle-income countries, this new 
knowledge has been used extensively to 
restructure public health systems.15,16 
However, changes occur much more 
slowly in low-income countries. In these 
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settings, there may be a need for a better 
understanding of theoretical foundations 
and more sharing of experiences.
As far as institutional arrangements 
are concerned, there are probably two 
key factors that determine the perfor-
mance of a health care organization.1 
First, there is the whole set of contracts 
that establishes the way an organization 
accesses the physical resources necessary 
to produce health services (hereafter 
called “physical resource contracts”). 
There has been much written about 
methods by which an organization 
accesses its cash income (e.g. fees-for-
service, capitation, budget-line items).17 
Yet, cash is only one of many types 
of resource. For example, receiving 
standard drug kits free of charge is not 
equivalent to paying the full price for 
drugs that one has ordered.2 The second 
key determinant of performance is the 
set of contracts that establishes the way 
in which those who hold discretionary 
authority over the allocation of resources 
mainly the owner, manager and health 
staff are remunerated by the organization 
(hereafter called the “governance and 
employment contracts”).
The combination of both sets of 
contracts establishes a nexus that makes 
up the institutional configuration of the 
health care organization.10,18 This institu-
tional configuration establishes incentives 
that will determine the behaviours of 
those holding discretionary authority 
and, ultimately, the performance of the 
organization.
There are as many possible institu-
tional configurations as there are possible 
combinations of different contracts. Yet, 
from the perspective of the organization’s 
stakeholders, some configurations are 
better than others, which explains why 
some configurations occur more fre-
quently than others. One must note that 
creativity is not limited to the design of 
contracts; the distribution of roles is also 
a variable.
An illustrative case is that of the 
single private practice, characterized by 
an individual who occupies the positions 
of owner, manager and employee. This 
arrangement has not occurred by chance: 
economists have shown that such an 
institutional configuration solves several 
problems that arise when one party (e.g. 
an employer) engages another party (e.g. 
an employee) to act on their behalf and 
in their interest — the so-called “princi-
pal-agent problem”. This configuration 
contrasts with the situation of public 
health centres, which are owned by the 
state (with the citizens as the ultimate 
owners), managed by a civil servant af-
filiated with the ministry of health and 
operated by other civil servants with 
fixed salaries.
There is no miracle solution; each 
configuration has its advantages and 
disadvantages. Typically, a configura-
tion will be particularly well suited for 
one dimension of performance (e.g. the 
efficient use of resources) but less suited 
for another (e.g. quality of care). The 
existing literature on provider payment 
contracts has brought attention to this 
trade-off. Yet, the existence of trade-
offs should not mean acceptance of the 
status quo. Our intuition, not only as 
researchers but also as workers who have 
been directly involved in the operation 
of public health systems, is that the 
configurations in place today in many 
low-income countries have more disad-
vantages than advantages. We wonder 
whether more powerful incentives for 
the health staff could provide the way 
forward to improved services in health 
care. We use the case of an experience in 
Rwanda to illustrate our proposition.
The performance initiative in 
Rwanda
The intervention
While Kabutare had been one of the 
most dynamic health districts in the 
three years following the 1994 genocide 
and war, its performance (in terms of 
coverage rates) declined in the period 
from 1999 to 2001. To reverse this trend, 
the Rwandan Ministry of Health and its 
operational partner, the international 
non governmental organization (NGO) 
HealthNet International (HNI), decided 
to reformulate their support strategy for 
health centres in 2001. In early 2002, 
they launched a contractual approach 
called the performance initiative. The 
general background, initial analysis, 
institutional arrangement and results 
of the experiment have been reported 
elsewhere.19
Before the introduction of the per-
formance initiative, staff at the 15 health 
centres had benefited from a fixed-bonus 
system (in addition to salaries). This 
system, inherited from post-war recon-
struction strategies, had been taken over 
by HNI from the previous NGO that 
was supporting the district. The rule 
was that health centres received a bud-
get that was calculated according to the 
number and qualification of employed 
individuals. Under the new scheme, 
individuals kept their base salaries (paid 
by the government or the health facility 
with revenue raised through user fees), 
but an output-based remuneration to the 
health centre replaced the fixed-bonus 
system. Payments for services were set for 
some key services delivered by the health 
facility (see Box 1). Table 1 summarizes 
key features of the two sets of contracts 
before and after implementation of the 
performance initiative.
Formalization and the data 
source
With some simplifications, we can use 
a mathematical formulae to compare 
the two institutional configurations. 
We have limited our analysis to the 
health centre (we did not analyse the 
whole health system and institutional 
changes at that level). Furthermore, our 
focus is on the two contracts that have 
changed significantly: (1) the support 
in cash funds provided by the NGO 
to the health centre; and (2) staff re-
muneration. We have simplified these 
contracts to their core logic (i.e. we do 
not formalize the complementary rules 
and restrictions in the actual contracts). 
To avoid the issue of differences between 
individual staff members with respect to 
bonuses, we have used average amounts 
per worker at each centre.
Box 1. Fees paid to health centres under the performance initiative
The performance initiative remunerates the health centres on a payment-for-service model 
(with a purchaser that is different from the user).
In 2003, the payments for purchased services were as follows: 
-  RWF 40 per consultation (new case);
-  RWF 250 per pregnant woman who received between 2nd and 5th dose of tetanus  
toxoid (TT);
-  RWF 1 000 per new acceptor of family planning;
-  RWF 500 per fully immunised child;
-  RWF 2 500 per assisted delivery.
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Table 1. Comparison of contractual arrangements before and after initiation of the performance initiative
Initial institutional configuration Performance initiative configuration
Physical resource contracts
Drugs The health centre buys them from authorised 
suppliers (mainly the health district medical store) 
with its cash income.
No change.
Vaccines and vertical 
programme items
They are supplied for free by the national 
programme.
No change.
Cash The health centre charges users for (i) drugs (with a 
mark-up), and (ii) for curative consultations and acts.
(i) and (ii) no change.
A third-party payer (a “steering committee”) pays a fee-
for-services for a limited list of curative and preventive 
services (see Box 1); the scheme is established by a contract 
that sets clear obligations upon the health centre; an 
independent agency checks the reality of reported figures.
Equipment Accessed mainly through donation, free utilization 
by the health centre.
No change.
Building Owned by the government, a congregation or the 
parish; free utilization.
No change.
Other Bought on the market by the health centre with its 
cash income.
No change.
Governance and employment contracts
Ownership and 
constrains on the 
owners
A health centre is a combination of multiple owners. 
The land and the building are owned by the main 
owner (the government, a congregation or the parish). 
Equipment, drugs and financial assets are owned 
by the “health committee” (a community body). All 
health centres are run as non-profit organisations. 
The Rwandan Ministry of Health oversees all of them.
There has been no formal change of this set-up. Yet, a 
new “management committee” has been established. It 
empowers the staff and put them in a position to take and 
enforce decisions to boost health centre performance.
Management (i) The health centre is headed by a head nurse. 
(ii) He is expected to implement policies made by the 
Rwandan Ministry of Health.
(i) The same, but higher involvement of staff (see above).
(ii) The health district authorities leave more discretion to 
the health centre team for initiatives.
Labour (i) Salaries of some qualified staff are paid by the 
government.
(ii) Salaries of some qualified and all non-qualified 
staff are paid by the health centre with its cash 
income.
(iii) Fixed bonuses are paid to most of the staff by 
the NGO.
(i) and (ii) no change.
(iii) The NGOa does not pay a fixed bonus. The (variable) 
monthly revenue collected from the performance initiative 
scheme is shared among the staff. An individual share 
is fixed by a grid that takes into account qualification, 
responsibility and presence at work. Bonus cuts can be 
used as a disciplinary measure.
NGO, non-governmental organization.
In general terms, one could then say 
that yearly income for the health cen-
tre team j is: Yj = nj .(w + b )+ a.(p.Q); 
where nj is the number of staff members, 
w is the average individual wage paid by 
the government or the health facility, 
b is the average individual fixed bonus 
paid by the NGO, p is the vector [1 × k] 
of prices for the vector [k × 1] of services 
Q, and a is the share of the output-based 
income distributed among the staff.
As there have been no major changes 
in the policy of the government with re-
spect to wages, we can assume that this 
element of the equation is constant and 
not relevant in our comparison. Then 
we can define Y ′ as the income paid to 
the health centre team by the NGO. 
The situation before the performance 
initiative can then be expressed as: 
Y ′ F,j = nj . b (with F as “fixed bonus”) and 
the one after the performance initiative 
as Y ′PI,j = a.p.Q (with PI as “performance 
initiative”).
This formalization allows us to 
identify the two behavioural assump-
tions behind the performance initiative: 
(1) that health staff would value higher 
average individual incomes, and (2) Q 
is partly determined by the behaviour 
of health staff.
Our analyses are based on the 
data used by the NGO to monitor the 
performance initiative. We will make 
the simplifying assumption that all the 
changes observed in the production of 
the health centres stem from change to 
the contracts. Although a strong causality 
has already been shown, we acknowl-
edge that this assumption is somewhat 
excessive.19 For the exchange rates, we 
have used the average over the period 
2001–03 (US$ 1 = RWF 483).
Results
During preparations for the new scheme 
in early 2002, different scenarios were 
considered and financial simulations 
were performed accordingly. The main 
goal was to determine the prices that 
would be used for buying the health cen-
tres’ outputs (eventual prices are shown 
in Box 1).
The rules were as follows: (1) no 
fixed bonuses (b was set to 0 for each 
individual i ); (2) the parameter a was 
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simulated as being equal to 1 (i.e. all of 
the scheme’s revenue was allowed to be 
distributed to health centre staff); and 
(3) the vector p was calculated in such 
a way that SY ′PI < SY ′F , if QPI, j = QF,j. 
This last constraint means that as an 
aggregate, the 15 health centres had 
to achieve greater production in order 
to realize the same income they had 
received under the previous system in 
2001.
This arrangement is illustrated in 
Table 2. The Y ′F (2001) column lists the 
fixed bonus received by health centre 
teams. The Y ′PI (2001) column is hy-
pothetical: it indicates what the health 
centre teams would have received under 
the performance initiative fees with 
their output level during 2001. The 
next two columns show the challenge 
conveyed by the new scheme: without 
a strong increase in production, income 
at most of health centres was projected 
to fall. This was especially true for the 
health centres without maternity wards: 
Matyazo, Mbazi and Sovu.
The fixed bonus system is based on 
the number of staff working in the health 
centre (with consideration for quali-
fications). The average annual bonus 
earned by a staff member in 2001 was 
US$ 236 per year (Table 2). Differences 
in average bonuses between the health 
centres are explained by differences in 
their qualification mix (with Sovu as the 
Table 2. Comparison of 2001 yearly income with the two incentive schemes
Income from the NGOa Gain for the facility Average individual bonusa
Nameb Ownership Staff (n) Y’F (2001) Y’PI (2001) Absolutea Relative Average b Y’PI / nj (2001)
Mbazi Ministry of Health 10 1 990 821 -1 169 -59% 199 82
Matyazo Sister congregation 17 3 744 1 644 -2 101 -56% 220 97
Gisagara Sister congregation 16 3 881 1 937 -1 944 -50% 243 121
Rango Ministry of Health 9 2 554 1 300 -1 254 -49% 284 144
Sovu Sister congregation 8 2 494 1 260 -1 234 -49% 312 158
Maraba Ministry of Health 7 1 292 1 130 -162 -13% 185 161
Gishamvo Ministry of Health 9 1 796 1 584 -213 -12% 200 176
Ruhashya Ministry of Health 8 1 779 1 413 -366 -21% 222 177
Save Sister congregation 16 3 993 2 911 -1 082 -27% 250 182
Cyanhinda Catholic Parish 9 2 102 1 849 -253 -12% 234 205
Simbi Sister congregation 10 2 554 2 127 -427 -17% 255 213
Karama Sister congregation 12 2 507 2 580 74 3% 209 215
Kabilizi Ministry of Health 6 1 245 1 308 63 5% 207 218
Rubona Ministry of Health 8 2 407 1 839 -569 -24% 301 230
Nyantanga Protestant church 6 1 245 2 150 905 73% 207 358
Total 151 35 583 25 852 -9 731 -27% 236 171
NGO, non governmental organization. 
a  Figures in US$.
b  Listed in ascending order of productivity.
most qualified team). The last column 
in Table 2 shows the average individual 
bonus to be received under the new 
performance initiative system, assuming 
constant production and staff numbers. 
A decrease in bonuses was projected for 
most health centres.
There is another way to interpret 
this last column. If the different fees are 
taken as relative weights for an output 
index, the last column is in fact a mon-
etary valuation of the outputs delivered 
on average by a staff member.3 We have 
ranked the 15 health centres according 
to this productivity indicator. In 2001, 
differences between the health centres 
were huge: Nyantanga staff were four 
times more productive than the team 
at Mbazi. Two main lessons stemmed 
from these simulations: the fixed bonus 
system could be seen as unfair and there 
was great potential for productivity im-
provement in many health centres.
Table 3 shows change after the per-
formance initiative in 2003, when the 
scheme had been fully implemented.
The Y ′PI (2003) column in Table 3 
shows the amount that each health 
centre received from the NGO in 2003. 
The next column lists the absolute gain 
for the health centre staff following the 
change from the fixed bonus to the 
output-based system. We see that two 
health centres (Gisagara and Sovu ) had 
a drop in income. Most made a gain, 
sometimes quite significant. The cost of 
the new scheme required a 31% increase 
from the previous budget, a rise that was 
acceptable to the NGO. In population 
terms, the increase per person was very 
small (around US$ 0.03).
The goal of measuring output 
gains is to assess whether the NGO 
received value for money. Ouput gain 
(Y ′PI (2003) – Y ′PI (2001)) gives a 
monetary value to the increase in out-
puts (along the fee-based index). Our 
data show that incentives do make a 
difference: all health centre teams have 
increased their outputs, even those that 
experienced a drop in income. The rela-
tive increases in output shown in Table 3 
are impressive – 80% on average. Inter-
estingly enough, we notice that those 
that made the biggest relative increase 
in their outputs are those that were least 
productive in 2001.
A comparison of simulated average 
individual bonuses due with 2001 pro-
duction (Table 2, last column) with data 
on the average individual bonus paid in 
2003 (Table 3) reveals a sharp increase in 
individual productivity. Whereas simu-
lations for 2001 data showed that only 
six health centres would have been above 
the US$ 200 threshold under the fixed 
bonus scheme, all but two health centres 
exceeded that threshold in 2003 under 
the performance initiative system. Staff 
members made efforts to increase health 
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centre production (at least with respect 
to outputs remunerated by the NGO). 
For the whole district, average individual 
productivity increased by 53%. When 
this productivity is combined with the 
18% increase in staffing, we reach the 
80% increase in total valued output 
observed.
The last column in Table 3 shows 
the difference between the actual average 
bonuses in 2003 and 2001. We see that 
the shift from the fixed bonus system to 
the performance initiative was beneficial 
for staff in 10 of 15 health centres. The 
gain per individual was quite limited: on 
average US$ 26 per year.
Discussion
Data from our trial of the performance 
initiative system in the Kabutare district 
in Rwanda lend support to observations 
made elsewhere: the contracting of 
primary health care outputs is a feasible 
option in low-income countries.20,21 
The “minimum package of activities”, 
a standard approach for defining the 
mission of health centres in low-income 
countries, seems to be, to a large extent, 
contractable.
This study on staff productivity 
indicates that public health staff have 
much more control over the quantitative 
production of their health centres than 
was previously thought. If incentives are 
revised, staff productivity can be much 
higher. In many poor countries, the 
Table 3. Yearly income under the performance initiative
Gain for the facility Output gains Individual staff membera
Nameb Staff (n) Y’PI (2003) Absolute
a Relative Absolutea Relative Y’PI /nj (2003) Average gain
Mbazi 10 2 231 241 12% 1 410 172% 223 24
Matyazo 19 4 199 455 12% 2 556 155% 221 1
Gisagara 15 3 365 -516 -13% 1 428 74% 224 -18
Rango 10 3 097 543 21% 1 797 138% 310 26
Sovu 11 2 006 -489 -20% 745 59% 182 -129
Maraba 9 2 786 1.494 116% 1 656 147% 310 125
Gishamvo 10 3 432 1.636 91% 1 849 117% 343 144
Ruhashya 9 2 348 569 32% 936 66% 261 39
Save 18 4 185 192 5% 1 274 44% 232 -17
Cyanhinda 11 4 053 1.951 93% 2 204 119% 368 135
Simbi 12 3 754 1.200 47% 1 627 76% 313 57
Karama 20 3 456 949 38% 876 34% 173 -36
Kabilizi 7 2 306 1.061 85% 998 76% 329 122
Rubona 9 2 399 -8 0% 561 30% 267 -34
Nyantanga 8 2 971 1.726 139% 821 38% 371 164
Total 178 46 589 11 006 31% 20 737 80% 262 26
a  Figures in US$.
b  Listed in ascending order of productivity in 2001.
scarcity of health workers places tight 
constraints on primary health care.22 
High staff productivity will be a neces-
sary step if significant progress is to be 
made in the reduction of unmet health 
care needs.
Yet, the concern for increasing 
coverage rates of primary health care 
activities should not be a reason for ne-
glecting other dimensions of the overall 
performance of the health care system. 
What are the possible risks associated 
with an output-based payment strategy, 
such as the performance initiative?
In Rwanda, five major risks have 
been identified at the health centre 
level. By remunerating a given list of 
key services, the performance initiative 
establishes incentives for staff to: report 
an inflated rate of delivery of these 
services; induce unnecessary demand by 
the users for the remunerated services; 
provide remunerated services, despite 
a lack of the required competence or 
inputs; neglect activities that are not 
remunerated; and increase quantity to 
the detriment of quality. Table 4 (avail-
able at: http://www.who.int/bulletin) 
describes these risks, the underlying 
causes, the dimensions of performance in 
jeopardy, the strategies to keep the risks 
under control and some key observations 
from Rwanda.
At the stage of designing the scheme, 
and later in its follow-up, it is crucial to 
keep a health system view in mind. Un-
desirable effects can indeed take place 
outside the health centre. Articulation 
with the hospital is particularly crucial. 
In the Kabutare district, for example, 
payment for delivering babies had desir-
able public health effects, mainly because 
there was an ambulance available and 
referral hospitals with enough reserve 
capacity to accommodate the increase 
in the number of transferred mothers 
in labour. Conversely, the fact that the 
performance initiative scheme did not 
extend to workers at the referral hospital 
was perceived as unfair by staff there.
This leads us to the last category of 
effects that an output-based payment 
may have: the undermining of other 
institutions. To coordinate themselves, 
actors within the health sector rely on 
a larger set of institutional mechanisms 
than merely contracts. Indeed, one can-
not specify everything into contracts 
and, at a certain stage, some trust is 
necessary.23 Internalized norms such as 
medical ethics and an ethos of public 
service are crucial, especially for the ser-
vices that are characterized by attributes 
that are difficult to specify in a contract 
(e.g. nutritional rehabilitation). Some 
observers have raised the concern that 
buying outputs may induce a shift in 
staff values or expectations (e.g. create 
the perverse perception that any behav-
iour deserves a specific payment). To 
avoid this problem, the bonus contracts 
in Kabutare clearly refer to medical 
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ethics and describe possible sanctions 
that would be imposed in case of fault. 
Another key rule is to resist temptation 
to use performance-based payment for 
any frustration encountered. For some 
problems (e.g. commitment to quality 
care), intrinsic motivation is probably 
more relevant than the crude extrinsic 
motivation of performance payments. 
One should still allow some space for 
processes of behavioural change that 
require time and investment.
Eventually, it should be ensured that 
during implementation, output-based 
payment does not negatively affect or 
“pollute” other approaches. Some coor-
dination must be found. A recent debate 
that took place in Rwanda illustrates this 
problem. While one agency advocated 
that district supervisors should be in 
charge of assessing the quality of activi-
ties to be remunerated and verifying that 
they had actually been performed, we 
recommended a clear split between the 
functions of supervision and monitor-
ing. Our point was based on the view 
that the monitoring and inspection 
function is inspired by distrust, while 
empathic supervision and coaching can 
not be realized without high levels of 
mutual trust. While both functions are 
necessary, there is an obvious clash of 
motives.
Output-based payment and per-
formance-based payment are not magic 
bullets. They can only tackle some of the 
problems encountered by health systems 
in low-income countries. Moreover, 
they convey risks of different natures. 
We would contend that some risks (e.g. 
patient safety) deserve more attention 
than others. At the design stage, a general 
recommendation to policy-makers is to 
secure some critical reviews by individu-
als such as clinical doctors and experts 
in quality assurance. At the launch of 
the scheme and later in its operation, 
it is crucial to remind people and to 
demonstrate that this is just one strategy 
among many.
Conclusions
Poor performance of the public health 
system in many low-income countries 
is probably due, to a large extent, to 
inadequate institutional arrangements. 
The Rwandan experience shows that 
contracting primary health care outputs 
is a feasible option in low-income set-
tings. Although the strategy is associated 
with some risks, its potential benefits are 
appreciable in settings where health care 
needs are not being met and there is a 
scarcity of health care workers. In view 
of our results, we make a plea for greater 
boldness in the trialing and development 
of similar approaches. However, bold-
ness does not mean haste or adventurism. 
There is a whole body of knowledge to 
build in the field of institutional analysis 
of public health systems in low-income 
countries. Our personal analysis is that 
previous “theories” and “models” that 
still dominate health policy today have 
largely ignored institutions, incentives 
and contracts that establish access to 
resources.7 As Le Grand has discussed in 
a recent review of public sector policies 
in the United Kingdom, it is possible 
that previous organizational models were 
based on certain behavioural assump-
tions — e.g. a widespread commitment 
among civil servants to subordinate 
their own interests to the benefit of the 
population — that might not be as valid 
now as they once were.24 We suspect that 
this analysis could be transposed to many 
low-income countries: since indepen-
dence, there have been marked changes 
to the prevailing ethos in the general 
population and among civil servants. 
Policies must take this new “human 
environment” into account.
We also need to know more about 
the design and implementation of such 
reforms. In fact, there is a whole body of 
best practices to set up, both in terms of 
science and policy.25 Scientific challenges 
range from the development of new ethi-
cal requirements in the case of an experi-
ment, methodological issues related to 
the design and validation of causal links, 
to the need for clear documentation of 
contexts and the embedding institutional 
environment. Securing critical reviews 
will also be extremely helpful.26 We have 
identified a few policy challenges with 
respect to design and implementation. 
A key issue will be how to involve stake-
holders — especially health staff — and 
secure their support for the reforms. 
New arrangements that link higher 
income to higher performance may be 
one way forward. To address this issue 
and many others that remain unresolved, 
we believe that more experience needs to 
be accumulated.
End notes
1. The reductionist view of an organiza-
tion that we use here is necessary for our 
analysis. Institutions, defined by North 
as “the humanly devised constraints 
that structure human interactions”, are 
much broader.27 Later in the paper, we 
discuss the importance of internalized 
norms such as codes of conduct and 
medical ethics.
2. It is important to note that for institu-
tional economists, resources are not seen 
from a physical perspective, but rather 
in terms of the property rights attached 
to them. To use the example of drugs, 
a health centre that is allowed to send 
back unnecessary drugs to the wholesale 
dealer and receive repayment as com-
pensation has more property rights than 
does a health centre that is not allowed 
to do so and, moreover, must meet the 
costs of destroying the expired tablets.
3. Use of the prices paid by the NGO to 
value the health centre production raises 
several normative issues that are com-
mon to any composite index. De facto, 
it means that non-remunerated activities 
have a nil value; this is a questionable 
approach, but not specific to this study 
(many social science studies do not 
report on side-effects, externalities and 
impacts that were difficult to measure or 
to attribute). Providing qualitative infor-
mation to the reader is then crucial (see 
Table 4 (available at: http://www.who.
int/bulletin)). An alternative approach 
would be to develop a more compre-
hensive index not constrained by the 
non-desirability or unfeasibility of con-
tracting the valuable health activities (the 
main reasons why some outputs were 
not remunerated by the performance 
initiative). A Delphi technique with 
national public health experts would 
then be a possible option. However, we 
believe that our pragmatic approach to 
the relative weights is acceptable for at 
least three reasons: (1) it gives informa-
tion about the NGO’s willingness to 
pay; (2) the process that established the 
prices was a very participatory one that 
was ultimately under the responsibility 
of the Provincial Health Department; 
and (3) the prices reflected what were 
perceived by public health experts as 
priority problems to be addressed by a 
pilot output-based approach.  O
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Résumé
Rémunération en fonction des résultats en vue d’accroître la productivité du personnel des centres de 
santé publics : contractualisation dans le district de Kabutare au Rwanda
Objectif Dans nombre de pays à faible revenu, les systèmes de 
santé publique ne répondent pas aux besoins et aux demandes 
de la population. Nous avons tenté d’évaluer dans quelle mesure 
une rémunération en fonction des résultats pourrait augmenter 
la productivité du personnel au niveau des établissements de 
santé.
Méthodes Nous avons évalué les performances de 15 centres de 
soins de santé du district de Kabutare au Rwanda, en comparant 
leur productivité en 2001, époque à laquelle des primes annuelles 
fixes étaient payées au personnel, avec celle atteinte en 2003, 
après la mise en place d’un schéma incitatif de rémunération en 
fonction des résultats.
Résultats Les modifications apportées à la structure des contrats 
ont conduit à une amélioration des performances des centres 
de santé : plus précisément, la mise en place de contrats tenant 
compte des résultats dans la rémunération du personnel de santé 
a entraîné de fortes hausses de la productivité de ce personnel.
Conclusion Les schémas institutionnels régissant les organisations 
de soins de santé méritent une plus grande attention. Ceux 
aujourd’hui en place dans le secteur public peuvent ne pas être 
les plus appropriés pour surmonter les difficultés rencontrées dans 
ce domaine d’activité. Il faut pousser plus loin les expériences de 
rémunération en fonction des performances pour confirmer les 
premiers résultats obtenus au Rwanda et ailleurs, car les risques 
associés à ce type de rémunération ne doivent pas être négligés.
Resumen
Remuneración basada en los resultados para estimular la productividad del personal en centros de salud 
pública: contratación en el distrito de Kabutare, Rwanda
Objetivo En muchos países de bajos ingresos los sistemas 
de salud pública no responden a las necesidades y demandas 
de la población. Decidimos determinar en qué medida puede la 
remuneración basados en los resultados estimular la productividad 
del personal que trabaja en los centros de atención.
Métodos Evaluamos el desempeño de 15 centros de atención 
de salud de Kabutare, Rwanda, comparando la productividad en 
2001, cuando se pagaba una bonificación anual fija al personal, y 
en 2003, año en que se implantó un plan de incentivos mediante 
sistemas de remuneración basados en los resultados.
Resultados Los cambios introducidos en la estructura de los 
contratos se asociaron a mejoras del desempeño de los centros 
de salud: concretamente, los contratos basados en los resultados 
aumentaron de forma pronunciada la productividad del personal 
sanitario.
Conclusión Hay que prestar más atención a la configuración 
institucional de las organizaciones de atención sanitaria. Las 
que ya forman parte del sector público pueden no ser las más 
apropiadas para afrontar los retos que hoy plantea la atención 
sanitaria. Es necesario realizar nuevos estudios para confirmar 
estos resultados preliminares de Rwanda y otros lugares, pues no 
se deben pasar por alto los riesgos asociados a los sistemas de 
incentivos basados en los resultados.
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صخلم
ادناور ،راتوباك ةعطاقم في دقاعتلا :ةيمومعلا ةحصلا زكارم في ينلماعلا ةيجاتنإ معدل لئاصحلا لىع زكترلما روجلأا عفد
 ةضفخنلما نادلبلا نم يرثكلا في ماعلا عاطقلل ةيحصلا مُظُنلا يبلت لا :فدهلا
 عفدل  نكيم  ام  ىدم  مييقت  انفدهو  .ناكسلا  تابلطتمو  تاجايتحا  لخدلا
 قفارم في ينلماعلا ةيجاتنلإ معد نم همدقي نأ لئاصحلا لىع زكترلما روجلأا
.ةيحصلا ةياعرلا
 ةنراقبم ،ادناور في ،اراتوباك في ةيحصلا ةياعرلل  ًازكرم 15  ءادأ انمَّيق :قرطلا
 عم ،ةتباث تآفاكم ينئمادلا ينلماعلل عفدي ناك امدنع 2001 ماع في ةيجاتنلإا
 لىع زكترلما روجلأا عفدب زفاوحلا ةطخ ْتَذ ِّفُن امدنع 2003 ماع في ةيجاتنلإا
.لئاصحلا
 ءادأ  في  ٍن ُّسحت  عم  تادقاعتلا  ةيلكيه  لىإ  لوحتلا  قفارت  دقل  :تادوجولما
 لىإ صاخ لكشب لئاصحلا لىع زكترلما ءادلأا دوقع تدأ دقف ،ةيحصلا زكارلما
.ينيحصلا ينلماعلا ةيجاتنإ في ةداح ةدايز
 نم ديزلما  ةيحصلا  ةياعرلا  تماظنلم ةيسسؤلما ةيلكيهلا  قحتست :جاتنتسلاا
 ثركلأا يه نوكت لا دق ماعلا عاطقلا في ًايلاح ةدوجولما تايلكيهلاف ،مماتهلاا
 ستمو  ،ةيحصلا  ةياعرلا  اههجاوت  يتلا  ةنهارلا  تايدحتلا  ةهجاولم  ةمءلام
 ،اهيرغ  ىرخأ  قطانم  نمو  ادناور  نم  ةركابلا  جئاتنلا  هذه  ديكوتل  ةجاحلا
 ةزكترلما زفاوحلا ططخ عم قفاترت يتلا ءاطخلأا لهاجت مدع بوجول ًارظن
.لئاصحلا لىع
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Table 4. Main possible effects of output-based payment on other dimensions of health centre performance
Incentive Reasons 
why the risk 
exists
Dimensions of 
performance put 
at risk
Strategies to limit  
the risk
Observations from  
experience in Rwanda
To inflate 
records 
for the 
remunerated 
activities
Asymmetry of 
information 
between the 
health centre 
and the 
purchaser on 
the reality of 
the outputs.
Efficiency: if there are 
ghost patients, paying 
for them is a waste of 
resources.
Equity among health 
centre staff: if a 
health centre gets 
income from activities 
it has not produced, 
it is unfair to other 
health centres.
(1) Consolidate honesty and 
probity within the health centre 
staff (e.g. by establishing 
transparency, co-management 
and internal regulation that will 
empower honest people versus 
colleagues tempted to cheat).
(2) Dissuade cheating by 
establishing credible sanctions. 
This relies on: (i) independent 
verification of registers and 
patients’ files; (ii) random visits 
to households; (iii) clear rules 
on what can be sanctioned; 
(iv) a high penalty; (v) and 
enforcement of sanctions.
No fraud has been reported. However, 
there was a need for patient records to be 
better recorded in the relevant registers. 
Rwanda is a tightly administrated country 
in which sanctions are enforced. This 
surely is a favourable contextual factor. 
To induce 
unnecessary 
demand 
for the 
remunerated 
activities
Asymmetry of 
information 
on the actual 
needs and 
demands of 
individual 
users.
Efficiency: if deviation 
from appropriate 
care induces an 
unnecessary cost.
Patient safety: 
if deviation from 
appropriate care 
creates new risks to 
the patient.
Patient centeredness: 
if the provider presses 
the user to use a 
service that does not 
meet her preferences.
Financial accessibility: 
if the induced 
demand increases 
costs for patients.
Efficiency: avoid remunerating 
activities prescribed by the health 
centre itself (e.g. laboratory 
exam).
Safety: adopt a cautious 
approach. Do not remunerate 
acts for which advantages 
appear lower than possible 
disadvantages.
Patient centeredness: accumulate 
more knowledge on patient 
preferences (e.g. surveys). 
For family planning, some 
independent follow-up through 
home visits could be an option.
Accessibility: reduce financial 
burdens on the households. If 
referrals are remunerated, then 
the ambulance should be free, or 
largely subsidized. 
Under the performance initiative, it was 
decided there would not be remuneration 
for hospitalization at the health centre 
level for patient safety reasons (despite 
the fact that the health centre is the 
favoured choice of households for treating 
severe malaria).
In fact, it is difficult to identify induced 
unnecessary demand. The lack of gold 
standards for many services is particularly 
limiting (e.g. what is ”over-referral”?). 
Moreover, a deviance from the norm or 
the mean may have its origin elsewhere 
(e.g. limited clinical capacity). Training and 
support are then the relevant responses. 
Interestingly, the Rwandan experience 
revealed that induced demand could 
be beneficial. Since the performance 
initiative, continuity and integration of 
services is much better. Health centre staff 
use antenatal consultation to convince 
mothers to deliver at the health centre; 
at the delivery, they remind them of the 
importance of childhood immunization; 
and during immunization sessions, they 
explain to the mothers that contraceptives 
are the best way to achieve birth spacing.
To deliver the 
remunerated 
activities 
in spite of 
insufficient 
capacity
Asymmetry of 
information 
on the 
technical 
capacity of 
the health 
centre.
Patient safety: if 
the health centre 
delivers services that 
are dangerous to 
the patient’s health 
because of a poor 
production process.
Effectiveness: if the 
health centre delivers 
services that are 
ineffective because 
of a poor production 
process.
(1) Ensure that health centres 
have the technical capacity 
to deliver activities that are 
remunerated. If necessary, 
require some accreditation 
process before entry into the 
scheme.
(2) Monitor that capacity is 
sustained.
(3) Develop complementary 
strategies to consolidate 
technical capacity.
Activities purchased by the performance 
initiative were all in the normal package 
of activities to be delivered by health 
centres. Yet, analysis of the routine health 
information system data has shown 
that health centres without maternity 
or with very low numbers of deliveries 
experienced a higher perinatal mortality 
during the first few months after they 
entered the scheme.a This could be an 
indication that technical capacity was 
not sufficiently present at the outset. In 
response, the project developed a list of 
key prerequisites before remunerating 
deliveries at the health centre level. 
a Meessen B, Musango L, Kashala J-P. The Performance Initiative [In French]. Kigali: HealthNet International; 2004.
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Incentive Reasons 
why the risk 
exists
Dimensions of 
performance put 
at risk
Strategies to limit 
the risk
Observations from  
experience in Rwanda
To neglect 
activities 
that are not 
remunerated
Asymmetry of 
information 
on the exact 
present and 
future needs 
of the covered 
population.
In the 
production 
process, some 
activities are 
in competition 
with others 
for the scarce 
inputs (e.g. 
time or effort 
by the staff).
Coverage of needs: if 
health centres neglect 
some population’s 
needs, as the services 
addressing them are 
not remunerated 
(e.g. because of the 
difficulty to measure 
or plan for them).
(1) Remunerate as many 
activities as possible.
(2) Specify in the contract that 
non-remunerated activities 
should be continued.
(3) Monitor the general 
production of the health centre 
through a supervisory body that 
is not directly accountable to the 
purchaser.
(4) Strengthen a knowledge-
based central body in charge of 
public health orientations.
Sources of incentive are numerous. For 
example, while hospitalization is not 
remunerated by the performance initiative, 
hospitalized patients are charged by 
the health centres, which could explain 
why admissions have increased over the 
period from 2001–2003. Another possible 
explanation for the increase is that since 
outpatient consultation is the entry point 
for many admissions, the increase in the 
former (partly thanks to the performance 
initiative) has induced an increase in 
the latter. In a multitasking set-up, the 
complementary or substitutive nature 
of the activities is a key determinant of 
organizational behaviours.b
To neglect 
quality 
attributes (on 
the basis that 
only quantity 
matters) of 
the activities 
that are 
delivered
Asymmetry of 
information 
on the exact 
attributes/
characteristics 
of the deliv-
ered services.
The produc-
tion of attri-
butes such as 
quality con-
sumes some 
resources; 
alterna-
tively these 
resources 
could be used 
to increase 
the output 
quantity.
Technical quality 
of care (including 
patient safety, 
effectiveness, patient 
centeredness): 
if the staff adopt 
lower standards in 
production processes 
to maximize the 
quantity of outputs 
(e.g. spend less 
time with individual 
patients).
(1) Specify in the contract that 
payment will be interrupted if it 
is observed that quality of care is 
not ensured.
(2) Maintain clinical and 
paramedical supervision, 
coaching and training.
(3) Establish new quality 
assurance mechanisms.
(4) Consider including quality 
attributes in the contract (see the 
next column for a listing of the 
difficulties in doing so).
There has been considerable debate in 
Rwanda about whether the contracting 
of quality indicators was a relevant 
strategy to tackle  poor quality of health 
care. Our reluctant stance on the issue 
is based on the following arguments: (i) 
many key attributes of health care are not 
contractable; (ii) for many attributes, direct 
observation is the only reliable method of 
control – however, this approach is very 
costly and if poor compliance to quality 
process is really a perverse result of the 
output-based payment, it will reappear 
once the controller has left the health 
centre; (iii) to a large extent, the poor 
quality of care in Rwanda has its roots 
elsewhere (e.g. inadequately trained staff) 
and these problems are probably better 
tackled through other strategies; (iv) to 
some extent, the objectives are aligned 
and many of the problems surrounding 
quality will be addressed by staff in their 
effort to increase production (e.g. drug 
stock management, data administration).
a  Meessen B, Musango L, Kashala J-P. The Performance Initiative [In French]. Kigali: HealthNet International; 2004.
b  Holmstrom B, Milgrom P. Multitask principal-agent analyses: incentive contracts, asset ownership, and job design. J Law Econ Organization 1991;7:24-52.
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